Rise to power

Milošević was elected Chairman of the Belgrade City Committee of the League of Communists in April 1986, again replacing Stambolić, who had moved on to the post of head of the Serbian Communist Party. At this time Milošević publicly opposed nationalism; he prevented the publication of a book containing the works of Slobodan Jovanović, a distinguished Serbian historian, law professor and nationalist politician of the early twentieth century. Milošević also advocated retaining Marxism as a school subject and publicly lambasted Belgrade's youth for their low turnout at the Communist Day of the Youth, claiming that their absence "desecrated" Tito's character and work.

Milošević emerged in April 1987 as the leading force in Serbian politics. His political positions have sometimes been termed as nationalist (though there is no indication of that in quotes or acts from Milošević in those years), although socialism and internationalism also marked his ideology. Later that year, in response to a protestor who complained of being beaten by the Police, Milošević said "You will not be beaten."[3]

Although Milošević was only addressing a small group of people around to him -- not the public,[4] a great deal of significance has been attached to his remark. Stambolić later said that "he had seen that day as the end of Yugoslavia".

At the same time, Milošević's message was in accordance with an international, cornerstone principle of the Communist party, which states that no ethnic group takes any precedence over another.

Meanwhile, Stambolić had become the President of Serbia. To the dismay of senior figures in the party, he supported Milošević for election as the new party leader. Stambolić spent three days advocating Milošević as leader, managing to secure him party leadership by the narrowest margin in the history of Serbian Communist Party internal elections. This was arguably the biggest mistake of Stambolić's political career, one which he later himself regretted, as soon Milošević would topple him at the 8th Session of the Serbian Communist Party.

Dragiša Pavlović, a Stambolić ally and Milošević's fairly liberal successor at the head of the Belgrade Committee of the party, opposed Milošević's policies towards Kosovan Serbs. Contrary to advice from Stambolić, Milošević denounced Pavlović as being soft on Albanian radicals. Milošević had prepared the ground by quietly replacing Stambolić's supporters with his own people; on 23 September and 24 September, during a thirty-hour session of the Communist Central Committee broadcast live on state television, Milošević had Pavlović deposed. Embarrassed and under pressure from Milošević's supporters, Stambolić resigned a few days later.

In February 1988, Stambolić's resignation was formalized, allowing Milošević to take his place as President. Twelve years later, in the summer of 2000, Stambolić was kidnapped; his body was found in 2003 and Milošević was charged with ordering his murder. In 2005, several members of the Serbian secret police and criminal gangs were convicted in Belgrade for a number of murders, including Stambolić's.

Milošević spent most of 1988/1989 focusing his politics on the "Kosovo problem". His supporters organized public demonstrations – the so-called "anti-bureaucratic revolution" – which led to the leaderships of Vojvodina (6 October 1988), and Montenegro (10 January 1989) resigning.[5]Azem Vllasi, leader of the Kosovo Albanian Communist Party, was arrested for inciting rioting amid a strike by Kosovo-Albanian miners.[6]

On 28 March 1989, the National Assembly of Serbia, under Milošević's leadership, amended the Serbian constitution to greatly reduce the autonomy of its two provinces. The decision was hugely controversial, especially in Kosovo, where many Albanians had never accepted the legitimacy of Serbia's annexation of the province in 1912. A harsh regime was imposed which attracted widespread criticism from international human rights organisations, transnational bodies such as the European Community and other foreign governments. This caused great alarm in the other republics of Yugoslavia, where concerns were expressed that their own autonomous status could come under threat.

As nationalism grew within Yugoslavia, Milošević sought major constitutional changes. The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution had organised the country so that Serbia's status as the largest and most populous republic was counterbalanced by the way that the other republics were represented. The socialist Yugoslavia was at the time governed by an eight-member Presidency, representing the six republics plus Kosovo and Vojvodina. By ousting the government of Montenegro and replacing it with a more compliant one, Milošević effectively secured that republic's vote for himself; likewise the abolition of the autonomous governments of Vojvodina and Kosovo ensured that he controlled those votes as well. The Presidency was thus divided down the middle between Milošević's supporters and his opponents in the other republics, with four votes for each side. The result was stalemate and an increasing paralysis of Yugoslavia's federal government.

At the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990, Milošević's Serbian delegation campaigned for major constitutional changes which would give greater political power too. Slovenian and Croatian delegations (led by Milan Kučan and Ivica Račan respectively) strongly opposed this, seeing it as an attack on their own republics' status, and left the Congress in protest. This caused a deep rift in the League of Communists and effectively put an end to the Party as a unified organisation.

With the collapse of the Yugoslav League of Communists, Milošević presided over the Serbian party's transformation into the Socialist Party of Serbia (July 1990) and the adoption of a new Serbian constitution (September 1990) providing for the direct election of a president with increased powers. Milošević was subsequently re-elected president of the Serbian Republic in the direct elections of December 1990 and December 1992.

In the first free parliamentary elections of December 1990, Milošević's Socialist Party won 80.5% of the vote. The ethnic Albanians in Kosovo largely boycotted the election, effectively eliminating even what little opposition Milošević had. Milošević himself won the presidential election with an even higher percentage of the vote. Although the elections could not have been described as wholly free and fair – Milošević controlled much of the media as well as the election system itself – there is little doubt that at this time he genuinely enjoyed mass popular support in Serbia.

Milošević's rise to power happened amidst a growth of nationalism in all the former Yugoslavian republics following the collapse of communist governments throughout eastern Europe. In 1990, Slovenians elected a nationalist government under Milan Kučan, and the Croatians did the same with Franjo Tuđman. Communist single-party rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina was replaced by an unstable coalition of three ethnically-based parties.

Milošević umeo da pridobija ljude

Kad se vratio, odmah je zakazao vanrednu sednicu Predsedništva CK. Bio je vidno uzbuđen, još pod utiskom onog što je tamo čuo i video. "Morina mora da podnese ostavku, ili je ja podnosim", rekao je. Rahman Morina je tada bio ministar unutrašnjih poslova na Kosovu. Smirivao sam ga i na toj sednici. Zamerio sam mu ono sa bijenjem naroda: "Uvek sam ti govorio da ne smemo da tučemo narod. Ali, nikad ti nisam rekao da javno kažeš da niko narod ne sme da bije. Pogotovo ne na Kosovu." On je teško doživeo te i neke druge kritike. Saopštenje sa tog sastanka je napisao sam. Nije odgovaralo onome o čemu smo razgovarali.Posle tog sastanka tera po svome. Sa Ćulafićem, šefom savezne policije, stalno se nešto dogovara. Fiksirao je da mora Morinu da smeni. Ni meni taj Morina nije bio simpatičan, ali sam insistirao da je to postupak i da nije moguće čoveka smeniti tek tako - zato što je neko to negde obećao. Tad počinju velike razlike i sporovi među nama. Ja sukob izbegavam. Postavljam stvari tako da ispada da se samo razjašnjavamo, da razrešavamo dileme... Izbegavam polemike i konflikte. Stvari, međutim, uzimaju svoj tok. U tom toku, poznato je, on je Morinu proizveo u ono u šta ga je proizveo. Na onoj sednici CK SKJ na kojoj je tražena odgovornost za ono troje, četvrti je bio Morina. Sećate se kad je ona grupa članova CK SKJ iz Srbije izašla sa tim predlogom. Međutim, od iznošenja te inicijative na samoj sednici, do zaključivanja sednice nešto se dogodilo, Morina ispada sa spiska. Kasnije, znamo, biva proizveden u šefa Partije na Kosovu. Iz nekih kasnijih razgovora shvatio sam da je Armija u Morinu imala poverenje. Zato sam Slobi i govorio da treba da bude oprezan. I sam sam bio oprezan oko Morine. To nije bila jednostavna stvar. Ko je znao kakve su se sve tamo igre odigravale. On je krenuo da ga smeni, a onda ga proizvodi u šefa Partije!Meni se Morina nije sviđao. I Lalović mi je govorio da su te njegove službene analize nacionalizma na Kosovu bile takve da je ispadalo da je od sedamnaest nacionalističkih ispada na Kosovu - šesnaest srpskih! Morina je odigravao neke igre.

Kakav je bio vaš i Miloševićev odnos posle tih događaja. Čuo sam da je i Petar Stambolić imao neke zamerke na Miloševićev boravak na Kosovu?

- Ja ne znam da se Petar u to uključivao. Milošević se Petru u mnogim stvarima veoma sviđao. Često su se viđali. Češće se Petar viđao sa Miloševićem nego sa mnom. Sa Petrom sam ponekad oko toga imao sporove i probleme. Govorio sam mu da Špiru (Galovića) i druge treba podsticati, a ovoga malo smirivati, a ne potpaljivati. Ali, Milošević je umeo da pridobija ljude kad su mu bili potrebni. Umeo je da bude predusretljiv, usrdan, ljubazan, pa i poslušan. Umeo je da pridobija i time što je bio radan, akuratan, naročito u poslovima do kojih mu je i lično bilo stalo. U tom pogledu, i ne samo u tom, on je zaista veoma "upotrebljiv" u politici, što se drastično pokazuje i ovih dana.

Govorite o periodu kad je Milošević bio predsednik Partije?

- Više kad je još bio predsednik Gradskog komiteta. Bio je jedan razgovor kod mene u Predsedništvu Srbije posle te Slobine posete Kosovu Polju. Prisustvovali su Ali Šukrija, Sinan Hasani, Ljubičić, Baja Vidić, Sloba... Sinan je zamerao Slobi onaj razgovor u Kosovu Polju, ja sam ga, međutim, veoma odlučno branio. Rekao sam, između ostalog, da u takvim prilikama, u suočavanju sa tolikom masom, čovek nije uvek u stanju da baš svaku reč odmeri. Kažem: "Ako se i omakla neka reč, to ne sme biti predmet razgovora između nas i čoveka koga smo poslali tamo. Uradio je posao kako je uradio. Mislim da je dobro uradio, jer se narod smirio." Slobi sam, međutim, u četiri oka rekao sve svoje zamerke.

Kako je Milošević primao vaše primedbe?

- Nije on njih više primao. Već mu je metal bio u ušima i on više ništa nije čuo. On više ništa nije čuo. Bio je to čovek koga je uzneo vihor. Pretvarao se da sluša. Ti govoriš, on se slaže, posle izda saopštenje kakvo on želi. Često suprotno od onoga što si mu govorio. U stvari, sa njim više nije bio moguć stvarni kontakt.

Neposredno posle toga dogodile su se one stvari u Pionirskom parku. Imali ste taj razgovor sa Ljubičićem i Miloševićem posle sednice CK SKJ o Kosovu. Nacionalisti vas napadaju iz sve snage... Zar vam sve to nije bilo dovoljno da sklopite mozaik i da počnete da brinete zbog svega? Omča je počela da se steže. Razgovarate li sa Petrom Stambolićem? Razgovarate li uopšte sa nekim? Ko vam je najpouzdaniji prijatelj... ? Kako reaguje vaše državno Predsedništvo Srbije?

- Vi stalno insistirate na tome da je trebalo da se ja bavim tim stvarima kao da je u pitanju obračun, borba za vlast... Ko će koga. To meni u glavi nije. Govorio sam vam, imali smo teške probleme pred sobom. Sve među nama i dalje shvatam kao razlike u pristupu problemima. Toga je u politici uvek bilo. Čak sam izašao pred Savet Republike i rekao da među nama nema sukoba, da smo jedinstveni u tome šta su glavni problemi, ali da ima izvesnih razlika u pristupu. Borim se do kraja da sačuvam jedinstvo. Sa stanovišta ranijeg merila jedinstva u Partiji, u vlasti, sigurno bi već tada neko od nas morao da ode, međutim, druga su i teška vremena. Uz to, činjenica je da smo već uveliko razvijali demokratske odnose ne samo u vrhovima partije i vlasti. Pravo na razlike, pa i sukobe u mišljenju više zaista nije bilo potrebno dokazivati. Tada ja zaista ne vidim sudbinske razlike među nama. Njih i nije bilo do samog finala, one su se mogle istinskim demokratskim dijalogom otkloniti da je svima bilo podjednako stalo do akcionog jedinstva, zapravo, do Srbije.
Nije vam padalo na pamet da oni žele da vas se oslobode?-

Ne. Uopšte. Pa nisam ja tada sedeo na prestolu, nego na bar dva-tri bureta baruta.
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